In less than two weeks, the Turkish capital, Ankara, witnessed an unusually intense and timely diplomatic and security surge regarding the Libyan file. This was highlighted by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Intelligence Chief İbrahim Kalın receiving a high-level delegation from western Libya that included Deputy Minister of Defense Abdul Salam Al-Zobi and National Security Advisor Ibrahim Dbeibeh. This meeting followed an extraordinary visit by Saddam Haftar, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the “National Army” from eastern Libya, to consult on regional developments and bilateral partnership. On the ground and in the economic sphere, these high-level consultations coincided with rapid preparations to organize a Turkish-Libyan economic forum in Benghazi, alongside Ankara’s growing investment footprint in eastern reconstruction projects, all against the backdrop of security movements and demonstrations in Tripoli and Zawiya. This overlap among military, economic, and field tracks reveals a fundamental shift in the nature of Turkish engagement on the Libyan stage.
This accelerated and parallel Turkish opening toward both sides of the Libyan divide reflects a comprehensive strategic repositioning, through which Ankara moves beyond its traditional approach of exclusive alignment with the northwest. Through this flexible diplomacy, Turkey aims to build a comprehensive security and economic “safety net” that serves two pivotal objectives: first, safeguarding its influence and gains in the Eastern Mediterranean while preserving the 2019 agreements against any sudden political arrangements; second, securing a central position as a key partner in upcoming security and regional setups, particularly amid the reshuffling of cards driven by the U.S. initiative for a political solution.
Ankara has moved past the overt alignment it practiced during the Tripoli war in favor of a policy centered on building points of convergence with all actual power centers in the country. This shift represents more than a temporary tactical maneuver; it expresses a deliberate response to realistic equations and a balance of power in which the General Command in the east has established itself as an indispensable actor in any sustainable political or security process. From this standpoint, repeated contact with leaders from both east and west aims to ensure that no upcoming settlement marginalizes Turkish interests or voids existing agreements.
Several interconnected geopolitical and economic drivers propel Ankara to accelerate its contacts across various Libyan components, chief among them being the protection of legal and security gains embodied in the two 2019 memorandums of understanding regarding maritime boundary delimitation and security cooperation. Ankara fears that any new unified executive authority might review or cancel these agreements if Turkey is not a partner in shaping them. Added to this is Ankara’s drive for economic expansion and participation in reconstruction and energy projects, alongside balancing growing Russian influence in the east and the broader regional competition, especially as Cairo intensifies its communications with parties in western Libya.
In engaging with the U.S. initiative—led by prominent figures such as Massad Boulos to form a unified executive authority paving the way for elections—Ankara seeks to position itself early within this track. These moves coincide with widely circulated proposals regarding power-sharing between eastern and western leaderships, such as retaining Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh as head of government while Saddam Haftar assumes the presidency of the Presidential Council. Direct Turkish coordination with both sides ensures that Ankara remains a critical factor in crafting the security and military framework accompanying any internationally backed political settlement.
This Turkish shift noticeably redraws Libya’s political and security landscape. On the ground, the Turkish opening toward the east helps de-escalate traditional military polarization, creating a more favorable environment for calm and reducing the likelihood of direct armed confrontation. However, this approach carries emerging risks: concentrating consensus solely at the level of top military leadership may overlook local complexities and fine-grained security arrangements in active operational areas like Tripoli and Zawiya.
Furthermore, relying on complex power-sharing arrangements among dominant factions risks deepening quota-based distribution among military and political elites, which could delay comprehensive elections rather than pave the way for them. Escalating regional competition to influence the shape of a unified solution might also turn political initiatives into an arena for settling regional scores, unless these moves align with clear and comprehensive understandings among major international and regional powers.
Turkey’s diplomatic and security posture in Libya reveals a new phase of strategic pragmatism, prioritizing political adaptability over rigid adherence to narrow traditional alliances. Turkish success in transforming this opening into a sustainable partnership will primarily depend on its ability to strike a balance between safeguarding the 2019 memorandums of understanding and fulfilling the aspirations of various Libyan parties for development and stability.
Over the long term, the window for consolidating this balance remains tied to the progress of the U.S. initiative and the capacity to formulate comprehensive security and political arrangements that integrate all institutions. Decision-makers in Ankara will need to approach the Libyan file not merely as an arena for preserving influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, but as a domain requiring solid regional consensus that spares Libya continued division while protecting long-term economic and strategic interests.