Within a matter of weeks, Saddam Haftar appeared to move beyond the role of a military figure operating within his father’s power structure. In Moscow, he sat alongside President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin, in a meeting that carried implications beyond traditional military cooperation, after having already visited Russia in May and met senior officials, including Defense Minister Andrei Belousov. In Egypt, he traveled to El Alamein for talks with General Intelligence Directorate chief Hassan Rashad, where discussions focused on unifying the executive authority and preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections. In Libya, meanwhile, he was received by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan during the latter’s tour of Tripoli and Benghazi, while he had previously met officials from U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
The most significant development, however, came from Washington itself. In June, Saddam met U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Massad Boulos in Washington, amid U.S. efforts to promote the unification of Libya’s institutions.
Taken together, these moves portray a figure whom competing capitals are increasingly treating as part of Libya’s future political equation, rather than simply as an extension of his father, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.
Preparing a Potential Successor?
The significance of Saddam Haftar’s rise lies not simply in the frequency of his foreign travel, but in the changing position he occupies within the power structure built by his father. He has gradually moved from commanding military formations to serving as deputy commander-in-chief, while his brothers have assumed other military and economic positions. Recent developments suggest that Saddam has become the most visible son on the international political and security stage, reinforcing the possibility that Khalifa Haftar is positioning him as the family’s potential successor.
Yet this succession is no longer purely an internal family matter. Saddam is increasingly being tested and engaged by Russia, the United States, Egypt, and Turkey, turning the question of succession within the Haftar family into an issue with broader regional and international implications.
From Military Operations to Political Engagement
Saddam Haftar’s initial rise was closely associated with his role as a military figure operating within his father’s command structure. In May, during his visit to Moscow, he discussed military cooperation, training, and improving the readiness and capabilities of the armed forces—an extension of his established role within the eastern military command.
What is striking, however, is that this military role has increasingly been accompanied by a diplomatic one. This became particularly visible during his meeting with Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin. The meeting was not presented merely as a military engagement: according to the Libyan side, discussions focused on institutional unification, stability, and Libya’s territorial integrity, while Saddam spoke of developing Libyan-Russian cooperation across multiple fields. Russia’s decision to receive Saddam directly at the Kremlin also suggests that Moscow is incorporating him into its political channels for dealing with the Libyan file.
This must also be viewed against the backdrop of Russia’s position in Libya. Moscow maintains an important military presence in eastern and southern Libya and regards the country as a strategic platform for projecting influence into the Mediterranean and Africa. The Kremlin meeting can therefore also be interpreted as an attempt to invest in a figure who could acquire greater weight in Libya’s post-Khalifa Haftar phase.
At the same time, relations with Moscow provide Saddam and the eastern leadership with room for maneuver vis-à-vis Washington. The Haftar camp does not necessarily appear to be choosing between Russia and the United States; rather, it is attempting to exploit competition between them to maximize its negotiating leverage.
Washington: From Dealing with Haftar to Dealing with Saddam
The most important shift may have come from the U.S. side. In August 2024, the commander of AFRICOM met officials in Tripoli before traveling to Benghazi to meet Khalifa Haftar and eastern military commanders. In February 2025, this engagement expanded to include Saddam himself, who met AFRICOM Deputy Commander General John Brennan in Sirte as part of contacts with eastern and western officials aimed at strengthening security cooperation.
This trajectory points to a change in Washington’s approach to the Haftar family. Rather than dealing exclusively with Khalifa Haftar as an entrenched military power, Washington has begun establishing channels of communication with the second generation of the leadership.
In June 2026, this engagement became more explicitly political when Saddam met Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Massad Boulos in Washington as part of discussions on cooperation and the unification of Libyan institutions.
The fundamental shift is therefore clear: Saddam is no longer being approached merely as someone capable of helping control military power in eastern Libya; he is increasingly being approached as a potential interlocutor on the structure of the Libyan state itself.
Egypt and Turkey: Expanding His Political Network
A similar pattern can be seen in Cairo. Saddam’s meeting with Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate chief Hassan Rashad in El Alamein was not exclusively a security meeting. It addressed the unification of the executive authority and preparations for presidential and parliamentary elections. It followed President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s meeting with Khalifa Haftar and came less than three weeks after Sisi had received Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, indicating that Cairo is maintaining channels with both sides of Libya’s political divide within a broader political process.
Turkey has displayed a similar willingness to engage with Libya’s different centers of power. During Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Libya, he met Khalifa Haftar, Saddam Haftar, and Khaled Haftar in Benghazi, after meeting Dbeibah, Mohamed al-Menfi, and Mohamed Takala in Tripoli. Institutional unification and the U.S. initiative were prominent issues in the background of the visit.
This is particularly significant given Turkey’s position during the 2019–2020 Tripoli war, when Ankara was closely aligned with western Libya. Its current outreach to the eastern leadership, including Saddam, suggests that dealing with eastern Libya is no longer viewed merely as a reluctant necessity, but as part of a more pragmatic approach to managing the country’s balance of power.
Why Saddam?
Saddam’s rise can also be understood through the redistribution of roles within the Haftar family itself. Khaled Haftar has become chief of staff, while Belqasim Haftar oversees reconstruction and economic resources. Saddam, meanwhile, has emerged as the son most deeply involved in the international military and political arena.
This division of roles may be part of an attempt to construct a succession system capable of preserving the family’s influence after Khalifa Haftar. Yet Saddam possesses an additional asset that distinguishes him from his brothers: the ability to cultivate direct relationships with major foreign powers.
That point is critical. The potential successor to eastern Libya’s dominant military leader does not merely need control over military power. He also needs to be acceptable—or at least workable—to the international actors shaping Libya’s political environment.
The intensity of Saddam’s contacts with Russia, the United States, Egypt, and Turkey gives him precisely this type of external capital.
The U.S. Initiative: Testing a Transition into Politics
This becomes particularly important in the context of the U.S. initiative led by Massad Boulos. According to the reported framework, the initiative proposes placing Saddam Haftar at the head of the Presidential Council while allowing Abdul Hamid Dbeibah to remain prime minister of a unified government.
The proposal is particularly significant because it would move Saddam from a military position into the heart of Libya’s political institutions. The reports in the file indicate that the initiative has received support from the eastern camp, while Dbeibah has not issued a final public position.
Yet the proposal contains a fundamental paradox. Washington may seek to use Saddam as part of a solution to Libya’s institutional division, but in doing so it could also reinforce the centrality of personal and familial power at the expense of institutional legitimacy.
The initiative could bring eastern military power and western executive authority into a single political framework. But without a clear electoral pathway, it risks reproducing Libya’s established pattern of elite bargaining and transitional arrangements.
Saddam’s rise should therefore not be viewed simply as a family succession project. It intersects with the interests of external powers seeking a figure capable of dealing with the realities of power in eastern Libya, while also serving Washington’s interest in reducing the country’s institutional fragmentation without assuming the costs of deeper direct involvement.
At the same time, Moscow, Cairo, and Ankara have incentives to establish early relationships with a figure who could become one of Libya’s most important future decision-makers.
If this trajectory continues, Saddam Haftar could gradually move from being a “potential heir” to one of the central actors shaping Libya’s balance of power. The equation is no longer limited to succeeding his father within the military establishment. It is increasingly linked to his ability to inherit part of the international network Khalifa Haftar has built and use it to consolidate his own position in future political arrangements.
The first potential consequence is growing competition within the Haftar family. Saddam’s position as deputy commander-in-chief, his expanding foreign outreach, and the possibility of his appointment as president of the Presidential Council could place him ahead of his brothers, particularly Khaled, who holds an important military position, and Belqasim, who has accumulated significant economic influence. Such a development could turn the distribution of responsibilities within the family into a competition over succession.
Second, the Presidential Council could become Saddam’s gateway to political legitimacy if the U.S. initiative succeeds. Moving from military command into the presidency of a political institution would fundamentally change his position and force him to demonstrate a different political skill set: the ability to manage consensus rather than simply command force.
Third, the success of a Saddam-Dbeibah arrangement will depend on whether Washington can convince Libya’s political actors and regional powers that the initiative is not simply another mechanism for redistributing positions among existing power centers. The proposal is unfolding alongside UN and regional efforts, while the absence of a clear electoral timetable remains a major weakness.
Ultimately, the significance of Saddam Haftar’s rise is not that succession has already been settled, but that succession itself is becoming an international political question. The more foreign capitals engage with him as a potential partner, the more he can move beyond being “Khalifa Haftar’s son” toward becoming an autonomous actor in Libya’s political equation. Yet this very rise could become a source of instability for the eastern camp if competition among the Haftar brothers evolves from a division of roles into an open struggle over the family’s military, political, and economic legacy.