How Service Crises Shape the Balance of Power in Libya?
The Libyan capital, Tripoli, witnessed a remarkable field escalation marked by the closure of numerous ministerial headquarters, as well as vital and service facilities. This administrative paralysis was accompanied by the erection of dirt berms in front of prominent institutions, such as the Administrative Control Authority, the Ministries of Civil Service and Local Government, in addition to headquarters belonging to the General Electricity Company, the telecommunications sector, and civil aviation. This reflected an advanced state of public anger over deteriorating living conditions and public services.
These actions are led by popular movements and local activists, most notably the “Sok Al-Jumaa Youth Movement” and the “Tajoura Residents Movement,” who declared civil disobedience and demanded radical reforms to confront what they described as government corruption and mismanagement. Despite their firm stance on the ground, these movements were careful to consider the immediate service needs of citizens by exempting hospitals, banks, police stations, and security agencies to avoid complete disruption to residents’ daily lives.
Regarding crisis management, local and institutional efforts emerged to curb further escalation. Dignitaries and elders of the Tajoura region intervened, alongside negotiations led by municipalities and security agencies in Zuwara to end the sit-in at the Mellitah oil complex. This breakthrough followed government promises and understandings aimed at improving power grid supplies and redistributing loads equitably, avoiding the risk of a complete shutdown and gas supply stoppage that threatened a total collapse of the national grid.
The electricity crisis in Eastern Libya
Conversely, the eastern region suffers from the exact same service crisis—characterized by power outages and repeated blackouts of the national grid due to technical faults, maintenance issues, and load management problems. However, this shared suffering among citizens did not translate into any protest manifestations or field movements similar to those seen in the capital, Tripoli. This raises questions about the nature of the political and security environment, as well as public behavior in the East.
The contrast was also evident in official handling of the crisis. Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar convened an expanded meeting with the Electricity Crisis Committee, attended by Osam Hammad, Prime Minister of the parliament-appointed government, along with energy sector officials and the Reconstruction and Development Fund, to discuss radical and urgent solutions to reduce outages. In contrast, there was a noticeable absence of direct communication from Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity, who continued to disregard field demands without issuing an official stance or addressing the protesting public regarding the escalating service crisis.
This contrast can be interpreted through several analytical angles. Eastern Libya is subject to a tight security and authoritarian grip under Haftar’s leadership, making residents hesitant to take to the streets to avoid security risks. On the other hand, this calm might reflect a degree of confidence in the capacity of eastern authorities to resolve crises, particularly given the active momentum of development and reconstruction efforts led by Haftar and his family, which extend beyond basic services to diplomatic and development dimensions. Should eastern authorities succeed in resolving the electricity crisis before the West, it will reinforce their legitimacy and double public confidence in them moving forward.
On the other hand, Dbeibeh faces growing challenges impacting his government’s domestic and international legitimacy. The persistence of service crises, disregard for popular movements’ demands, and recurring administrative paralysis in the capital’s institutions are bound to accelerate the decline of his government’s procedural and public legitimacy, thereby weakening its negotiating and political position in any future arrangements governing the Libyan landscape.